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CVE-2026-90436: unauthenticated RCE in end-of-life Apache Axis 1.x, exploited via Confluence and N-central

An unsafe reflection flaw in Apache Axis 1.x SOAP fault handling (CVSS 9.8, CISA KEV) gives unauthenticated RCE. No upstream fix. Exposure checks, detection, IOCs and remediation.

This one is awkward. The vulnerable code is Apache Axis 1.x, a SOAP engine that went end-of-life years ago, and Apache has said it won’t ship a fixed release. Products that still bundle Axis 1.x are now being exploited through it. Atlassian Confluence Data Center and N-able N-central are the two confirmed so far. CISA added it to the KEV catalog on 18 November with a federal due date of 21 November, three days later. For the wider context, see my 2026 RCE field guide. If your Confluence sits behind Apache httpd, also check the HTTP/2 race condition from yesterday.

Scope and ethics. This post covers architecture, exposure checks, detection and remediation for systems you own or are authorized to assess. It contains no SOAP requests that trigger the bug and no exploit code. Lab validation here means confirming versions, jars and config on a VM you control, not firing a PoC.

At a glance

   
CVE CVE-2026-90436, Apache Axis unsafe reflection
Severity CVSS 3.1 9.8 Critical, AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (CISA ADP, via NVD). Atlassian rates its Confluence exposure CVSS 4.0 9.3
CWE CWE-470, Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code (“Unsafe Reflection”)
Affected Apache Axis 1.x, all versions through 1.4 (EOL). The advisory doesn’t cover Axis2/Java, which is a separate codebase and Apache’s recommended migration target
Fixed in No upstream release. Apache published a source patch (commit 41f3b4e). Vendor fixes: Confluence Data Center 9.2.28 (10.x removes the feature), N-central 2026.4 HF3 (2026.4.1.39)
Exploited? Yes. Rapid7 saw exploitation against Confluence on 13 Nov, and N-able reported N-central attacks the same day. CISA KEV added 18 Nov (due 21 Nov) with forensic triage required
Auth / interaction None / none

Description: how the bug works

Apache disclosed the issue on 6 November 2026. José Apari-Pantigozo of OKIOK found it. It sits in the code path that parses an inbound SOAP fault.

A SOAP <Fault> can carry a <detail> block naming the Java exception that caused it, so Axis can rebuild a typed exception on the receiving side. Per Apache’s advisory, when that detail includes an exceptionName element, Axis loads the named class. If a string data element is also present, Axis instantiates the class through its String constructor, and only then checks whether the result is actually an AxisFault. The type check comes too late:

  • Loading a class runs its static initializer. Just naming a class is enough to execute that class’s static setup code.
  • Calling a String constructor with attacker-supplied text is a well-known reflection primitive. Whether it leads to code execution depends on which classes are on the application’s classpath. That’s why the advisory says RCE needs “a suitable class” to be available. Large products such as Confluence ship plenty of classes.

The second point is what makes this serious. The fault is parsed while Axis is still working out which service the message is for, before any per-service handler chain runs. Authentication handlers configured on a SOAP service never get a say, so service-level auth doesn’t protect you. Field Effect notes the same.

Apache’s patch commit hardens both steps. It loads the named class without initializing it, so no static initializer runs. It accepts the class only if it’s an AxisFault subtype, and it calls the reflective constructor only for genuine AxisFault subclasses. Legitimate custom faults keep working. Apache isn’t releasing it as a 1.x build, so you only get it if you rebuild Axis yourself or your vendor ships it.

Impact

Remote code execution as the account running the host Java application, with no credentials. What that means depends on what bundles Axis:

  • Confluence Data Center. Rapid7’s incident write-up describes an intrusion that went from a SOAP request to bash and curl running as the confluence user within seconds. The attacker then enumerated the Confluence config, encryption keys and database settings. About three minutes in they queried MySQL with Confluence’s own database credentials, hunting for pages and attachments mentioning credentials, tokens, VPN configs and private keys, and ran Luhn checks for card numbers. They queried Crowd for users and groups and tried AS-REP roasting against a domain controller. After about 4 hours they used a stolen service-account credential against a cloud data warehouse. At about 12 hours they signed in to Microsoft 365 with legacy auth. Rapid7 thinks the tooling was likely AI-assisted, based on the structured task output.
  • N-able N-central. This is an RMM platform. Field Effect points out that root on the N-central server can push scripts and software to every managed endpoint. N-able’s IOCs include cryptominer staging (xmrig.tgz).

Which deployments are exposed

Where Axis 1.x lives Exposure condition Fix
Confluence Data Center 1.x–9.x Only if Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP) is enabled. Atlassian says it’s been off by default for new installs since 3.0, but many long-lived instances turned it on for integrations 9.2.28, or move to 10.x (Remote API removed). Atlassian Cloud is not affected
N-able N-central (on-prem) Only if Legacy API is enabled. N-able says it’s disabled by default 2026.4 HF3 (2026.4.1.39), which permanently blocks legacy APIs. N-able’s release notes don’t name this CVE, but Rapid7 and Field Effect both list HF3 as the fix
Custom Java apps / internal SOAP services Any reachable Axis 1.x SOAP endpoint (often /axis/services/...) Migrate to Axis2/Java or another maintained SOAP stack, or rebuild Axis with the upstream patch
Other vendor products and OS packages Unknown. Field Effect says Ubuntu and Debian track their Axis packages as affected with no fixed version Watch your vendors’ advisories

Prerequisites: network reachability to an Axis 1.x SOAP endpoint, a suitable class on the classpath (true for the confirmed products), no credentials, and no user interaction. Rapid7 says a public PoC targeting N-central appeared on 12 November and a Metasploit module followed on 17 November, so the barrier to entry is now very low.

Identifying affected systems

Axis 1.x hides inside WARs, vendor installs and container images, often renamed or nested. Search by jar name and by class content. Run these only on hosts you administer.

# 1) Loose jars on disk (Axis 1.x ships as axis.jar / axis-1.4.jar; Axis2 is axis2-*.jar)
find / -xdev \( -iname 'axis.jar' -o -iname 'axis-1*.jar' \) 2>/dev/null

# 2) Jars renamed or shaded: look for the Axis 1.x engine class itself
find / -xdev -name '*.jar' 2>/dev/null | while read -r j; do
  unzip -l "$j" 2>/dev/null | grep -q 'org/apache/axis/AxisFault.class' && echo "AXIS1: $j"
done

# 3) Inside WAR/EAR files: list embedded Axis jars without extracting
find / -xdev \( -name '*.war' -o -name '*.ear' \) 2>/dev/null | while read -r w; do
  unzip -l "$w" 2>/dev/null | grep -iE 'WEB-INF/lib/axis(-1[^/]*)?\.jar' | sed "s|^|$w: |"
done

# 4) Version of a jar you found (Axis 1.4 reports Implementation-Version: 1.4)
unzip -p /path/to/axis.jar META-INF/MANIFEST.MF | grep -iE 'version|title'

# 5) Maven/Gradle projects: the coordinates are axis:axis and org.apache.axis:axis
mvn -q dependency:tree -Dincludes=axis:axis,org.apache.axis:axis

Don’t confuse it with Axis2: org/apache/axis2/... classes and axis2-kernel-*.jar aren’t covered by this advisory. If your SBOM tool supports it, query for pkg:maven/axis/axis and pkg:maven/org.apache.axis/axis.

Confluence: check the setting under General Configuration → Further Configuration → Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP). Atlassian gives a benign check from the outside: browse to <base_url>/plugins/servlet/soap-axis1/confluenceservice-v2. HTTP 403 means the Remote API is off. An AXIS service or confluenceservice-v2 message means it’s on and reachable.

curl -s -o /dev/null -w "status=%{http_code}\n" \
  https://confluence.example.com/plugins/servlet/soap-axis1/confluenceservice-v2

N-central: confirm the version is 2026.4.1.39 or later, and on older builds confirm Legacy API is disabled, following N-able’s KB article.

Safe validation in an isolated lab

You don’t need to fire the bug to prove your controls work:

  1. On an isolated VM, deploy a throwaway Tomcat with a sample WAR that bundles axis-1.4.jar. Then run the find/unzip sweeps above and your SCA or SBOM scanner. Both should flag it. If the scanner misses it inside the WAR, fix that before trusting fleet results.
  2. For Confluence, in a non-production test instance, toggle Remote API on and off and confirm the endpoint goes from an Axis response to 403. That’s the same check you’ll run in production after the mitigation.
  3. Simulate the post-exploitation signal benignly: have the Tomcat or Confluence service account run bash -c id from a test hook, and confirm your EDR rule for “Java spawns shell” fires and pages someone.

Detection and threat hunting

  • Web logs. Rapid7 saw unauthenticated POSTs to /plugins/servlet/soap-axis1/confluenceservice-v2 that each returned HTTP 500, immediately followed by command execution. Hunt Confluence and Tomcat access logs for POSTs to that path, or for generic Axis paths like /axis/services/ in custom apps, especially bursts of 500s from IPs that never authenticate.
    grep -hE 'POST [^ ]*(soap-axis1|/axis/services/)' /path/to/confluence/logs/*access* \
      | awk '{print $1, $4, $7, $9}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head
    
  • Process lineage. The highest-fidelity signal is the Confluence/Tomcat java process spawning bash, sh, curl, wget, python, perl or base64. Rapid7’s case showed bash and curl under the confluence service account. Also watch for GetNPUsers.py or other Impacket tooling from an app server.
    for p in $(pgrep -f 'java.*(confluence|catalina)'); do ps --ppid "$p" -o pid=,user=,lstart=,cmd= ; done
    
  • Database and file access. Look for unusual MySQL/PostgreSQL queries from the Confluence DB user against page bodies, application links and attachments, and bulk reads of /var/atlassian/application-data/confluence/attachments/v4/.
  • Identity follow-on. Microsoft 365 legacy-auth sign-ins by integration or service accounts, and new use of service credentials against cloud data warehouses.
  • Published IOCs (Rapid7, Confluence intrusion): IPs 192.238.253[.]176, 5.133.47[.]243, 163.182.68[.]109, 104.13.106[.]166; domains *.trycloudflare[.]com, wpefh-192-238-253-176.free.pinggy[.]net, webhook[.]site. N-central (N-able): 157.20.241[.]16 (ports 8080 and 19202–19418, serving /jup.sh, /xvgz, /xmrig.tgz, /ob/cronhit, /ob/fcheck), 139.99.69[.]109:10128, 79.76.51[.]56:39100. Rapid7 notes that not finding these doesn’t mean you weren’t hit.

CISA flagged this entry for forensic triage. Treat any instance that had the SOAP interface reachable after 6 November as potentially compromised, and investigate before you mark it clean.

Remediation

  1. Confluence: upgrade to 9.2.28 or a current 10.x release. Atlassian no longer ships binary patches.
  2. N-central: upgrade to 2026.4 HF3 (2026.4.1.39) as an emergency change, confirm Legacy API is off, and follow N-able’s agent/probe upgrade guidance.
  3. Your own Axis 1.x apps: migrate to Axis2/Java or another maintained SOAP engine. If you can’t do that quickly, rebuild Axis from source with Apache’s commit 41f3b4e8d04e310ca81f86b92630ab2c11d608bd applied and redeploy. Apache isn’t shipping a fixed 1.x release, so this is the only upstream fix.
  4. Everything else that bundles Axis 1.x: ask the vendor directly. “We use a SOAP library” isn’t an answer. Ask for the jar name and the fix.
  5. If you find compromise: rebuild the host. Rotate the application’s database credentials, encryption keys, integration tokens and any service-account secrets it could read. Then review identity, cloud and M365 sign-in activity for those accounts.

Interim mitigations (if you truly can’t patch today)

  • Confluence: uncheck Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP) under General Configuration → Further Configuration. No restart is needed. Verify the SOAP endpoint now returns 403. This can break scripts and add-ons that use the API, so tell their owners.
  • N-central: make sure Legacy API is disabled.
  • Custom apps: block the Axis SOAP paths at the reverse proxy or WAF, or restrict them to known client IPs. Remember that service-level auth handlers don’t help here, because the fault is parsed before they run.
  • Restricting network access buys time, but it isn’t a fix. Exploitation is automated and a Metasploit module is public.

References

Verify every version against the vendor advisory before acting. Published 19 Nov 2026.