CVE-2026-123158 (SSHole): OpenSSH password bypass on musl, no-PAM Linux
On musl-based Linux builds without PAM, sshd accepts any very long password for some accounts (CVSS 8.1, on CISA KEV). Root cause, who is exposed, detection, IOCs and the fix.
This one is narrow, but where it applies it’s about as bad as SSH bugs get: a password login that succeeds without the password. It only hits Linux systems where sshd is built against musl libc with PAM disabled, which in practice means Alpine Linux hosts, Alpine-based containers that run sshd, and anything else built the same way. Glibc distros with PAM (most Debian, Ubuntu and RHEL installs) are not in the described scope. It was fixed on 5 November, exploited within two days, and added to CISA’s KEV catalog on 9 November.
Scope and ethics. This post covers root cause, exposure checks, detection and remediation for systems you own or are authorized to assess. It contains no exploit code or trigger inputs. Lab validation here means confirming package versions and effective
sshdconfiguration on a VM you control, not attempting logins against anyone’s server.
At a glance
| CVE | CVE-2026-123158, nicknamed “SSHole” by researchers and GreyNoise |
| Severity | CVSS 3.1 8.1 High, AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (MITRE CNA, via NVD) |
| CWE | CWE-394 Unexpected Status Code or Return Value (NVD, CISA) |
| Affected | sshd in OpenSSH before 10.6p2 on Linux, built with musl libc and without PAM (NVD) |
| Fixed in | OpenSSH 10.6p2 (5 Nov 2026). Alpine backported the fix to every branch from 3.16 to edge (table below) |
| Exploited? | Yes. CISA KEV, added 9 Nov 2026 (federal due date 12 Nov), with forensic triage required. GreyNoise saw the first successful exploitation on 7 Nov |
| Auth / interaction | None / none, but only for specific account configurations |
Description: how the bug works
OpenSSH’s own release note is short: 10.6p2 adds a workaround for “a password authentication bypass that is exploitable through sshd(8) that affects some Linux systems when built and run with PAM support disabled.” The maintainers say the root cause is outside sshd, but that sshd is where it can be blocked.
Alpine’s advisory explains the mechanism:
- Without PAM, sshd checks passwords itself. It hashes the attempt with
crypt()using the salt from the account’s shadow entry and compares the output to the stored field. - Some accounts have no real hash. Their shadow field is just
*: no password set. That’s the default forrooton recent Alpine base images, key-only users created without a password, thealpineuser in tiny-cloud images, and directory-service users with no shadow entry. Because*is too short to hold a salt, sshd borrows the salt from another account on the system. - musl’s
crypt()signals errors with*. When the supplied key is longer than 256 bytes, musl’scrypt()returns the string*to mean “error”. - The error string matches the stored value. sshd compares
*(error) with*(no password), they’re equal, and the login succeeds.
So the trigger condition is an account whose password field is *, plus at least one other local account with a $5$ or $6$ hash to provide a salt, plus a long password attempt. NVD describes the length as 256 to 1024 characters and Alpine as 257 to 1024 bytes. Alpine notes that the attack takes a single connection and needs no retries. That’s why “high complexity” in the CVSS vector understates the risk once your configuration matches.
This is a textbook CWE-394: a caller treated an error return value as a legitimate result.
Impact
- Unauthenticated interactive login as any matching account, over the network.
- On images that give passwordless
doasto the login user (Alpine’s tiny-cloud images ship analpineuser with*and passwordlessdoas), that becomes root. rootitself has*on recent base images, but Alpine notes it’s protected by the defaultPermitRootLogin prohibit-passwordunless you’ve overridden it.- One account with a real password hash is enough to expose every
*account on the host.
Who is exposed
| Configuration | Status (per Alpine) |
|---|---|
Alpine openssh-server (built without PAM), PasswordAuthentication yes (default) |
Affected |
Alpine openssh-server-pam with UsePAM no |
Affected |
openssh-server-pam with UsePAM yes |
Not affected |
PasswordAuthentication no |
Not affected |
No account on the host has a $-style hash |
Not affected |
Accounts locked with ! (rather than *) |
Not affected |
Cloud-init images that write PasswordAuthentication no |
Not affected |
Containers that don’t run sshd at all |
Not affected |
Alpine checked releases 3.21 to 3.24 and edge, plus unsupported 3.16 to 3.20; all were affected. Alpine tiny-cloud images from 3.18.11 through 3.24.3 are safe on first boot but become exploitable as soon as any $6$ hash exists on the machine.
Outside Alpine, think about any musl-based build of OpenSSH without PAM: custom embedded or appliance images, and Docker images that bake in an Alpine sshd (NVD’s references include issue threads from such projects). Ask your vendors.
Identifying affected systems
You need three facts per host: which libc sshd uses, whether PAM is in play, and whether the package includes the fix.
# 1) Version. Note: distros backport, so the upstream number alone isn't the answer
ssh -V
sshd -V 2>&1 | head -n1 # newer sshd builds; otherwise rely on the package version
# 2) Is sshd linked against musl?
ldd "$(command -v sshd)" 2>/dev/null | grep -i musl
# 3) Effective config (run as root): what sshd will actually do
sshd -T | grep -Ei '^(passwordauthentication|usepam|permitrootlogin) '
# 4) Alpine: which openssh package and revision is installed?
apk list -I 'openssh*' 2>/dev/null
# 5) Precondition check: accounts with '*' and whether any '$5$'/'$6$' hash exists
awk -F: '$2=="*" {print "no-password:", $1}' /etc/shadow
awk -F: '$2 ~ /^\$[56]\$/ {n++} END {print "accounts with $5/$6 hash:", n+0}' /etc/shadow
A host is exposed when sshd is musl-linked, PAM is off (no PAM build, or usepam no), passwordauthentication yes, the package is older than the fixed revision, and step 5 shows at least one * account and at least one $5$/$6$ hash.
Alpine fixed package revisions (from Alpine’s advisory):
| Branch | Fixed openssh |
|---|---|
| edge | 10.6_p2-r0 |
| 3.24 | 10.3_p1-r2 |
| 3.23 | 10.2_p1-r1 |
| 3.22 | 10.0_p1-r11 |
| 3.21 | 9.9_p2-r1 |
| 3.20 | 9.7_p1-r6 |
| 3.19 | 9.6_p1-r3 |
| 3.18 | 9.3_p2-r4 |
| 3.17 | 9.1_p1-r7 |
| 3.16 | 9.0_p1-r6 |
Alpine point releases 3.21.10, 3.22.8, 3.23.8 and 3.24.4 include the fixed package. Note how this works with backports: a 3.24 host on 10.3_p1-r2 is fixed even though ssh -V reports a version far below 10.6p2.
Containers: check images, not just hosts. List images whose entrypoint or process list includes sshd, then run step 4 inside each:
docker ps --format '{{.ID}} {{.Image}}' | while read -r id img; do
docker exec "$id" sh -c 'pgrep -x sshd >/dev/null && apk list -I "openssh*" 2>/dev/null' \
| sed "s|^|$img: |"
done
Safe validation in an isolated lab
You don’t need to attempt a bypass to prove you’re fixed or mitigated:
- On an isolated VM or container network, build two Alpine images: one pinned to a pre-fix
openssh-serverrevision and one on the fixed revision for the same branch. - Run the checks above against both. Your inventory or vulnerability scanner should flag only the old one. If it flags neither, it’s probably matching on upstream version strings and missing Alpine revisions.
- On the old one, apply the interim mitigation (
PasswordAuthentication no) and confirmsshd -Treports it. Restartsshdand confirm key-based login still works. - Make a normal, legitimate password login to a test account and confirm the
Accepted password forline reaches your SIEM. That’s the event you’ll hunt on below.
Detection and threat hunting
SSH is encrypted, and GreyNoise points out that spotting attempts from network traffic alone is hard. Focus on authentication logs and host artifacts.
- Successful password logins to accounts that have no password. On Alpine, search
/var/log/messages(or wherever syslog goes) forAccepted password for <user>where<user>is one of the*accounts from step 5. Any hit is a strong signal, because those accounts can’t legitimately log in with a password.NOPW=$(awk -F: '$2=="*" {print $1}' /etc/shadow | paste -sd'|') grep -E "Accepted password for ($NOPW) " /var/log/messages* 2>/dev/null - Post-login activity. Alpine recommends reviewing
doasuse, newly created users, recently changed files andauthorized_keysfiles. If you can’t rule out a login, treat the machine as compromised. - Published IOCs (GreyNoise, cluster “GT10”). C2 domain
tac.vpnla.org; host artifacts/opt/py3,/tmp/py3.tar.gz,/usr/local/bin/tac_agent.py,/etc/init.d/tac-agent, and an extrasshdlistening on port 2222; HASSH client fingerprintsa2de0f306611e0957be704f5b0e35a82and38da7a9dfb196c72a7354bb4cdce64d9. GreyNoise also lists source IPs on its tracker page. GreyNoise notes that not all SSHole activity is attributable to GT10, so absence of these IOCs isn’t proof of a clean host.ls -la /opt/py3 /tmp/py3.tar.gz /usr/local/bin/tac_agent.py /etc/init.d/tac-agent 2>/dev/null ss -ltnp | grep -E ':2222\b' - Timeline. Per GreyNoise: fix published 5 Nov 09:00 UTC, first public exploit on GitHub 5 Nov 13:16 UTC, first successful exploitation on their sensors 7 Nov 00:46 UTC. Hunt back to at least 5 November on anything that was exposed.
CISA set forensic triage to “Yes” for this entry, which tells you how it expects agencies to treat exposed hosts: look for compromise, don’t just patch.
Remediation
- Upgrade to OpenSSH 10.6p2, or on Alpine to the fixed revision for your branch:
apk upgrade -U -a. - Restart sshd. Alpine stresses that upgrading alone leaves the old daemon running:
rc-service sshd restart. - Rebuild and redeploy any container image that runs
sshdon an Alpine base. Pinned base tags keep the bug. - Refresh cloud images. For tiny-cloud deployments, the fixed images start at 3.21.10, 3.22.8, 3.23.8 and 3.24.4. Existing instances need the package update or the mitigation below.
- Hunt using the section above, and rotate credentials on any host you can’t clear.
Interim mitigation (if you can’t patch today)
Turn off password authentication. It’s the documented workaround, and on most servers it’s what you want anyway:
# Keep an existing session open while you do this, and confirm key login works afterwards
echo 'PasswordAuthentication no' > /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-no-password.conf
grep -q '^Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/' /etc/ssh/sshd_config || echo 'check that your sshd_config includes sshd_config.d'
sshd -t && rc-service sshd restart
sshd -T | grep -i '^passwordauthentication'
sshd uses the first value it reads for each keyword, so if the drop-in isn’t included, or an earlier line sets PasswordAuthentication yes, fix sshd_config itself. The final sshd -T line is what counts. Alpine’s advisory has a fuller version with a backup and rollback. Also check that PermitRootLogin is at its prohibit-password default, and restrict port 22 to management networks where you can.
References
- CVE-2026-123158, NVD · CISA KEV entry
- OpenSSH 10.6p2 release notes
- OpenSSH portable fix commit
- Alpine Linux advisory: openssh password authentication bypass
- GreyNoise SSHole tracker (timeline, IOCs)
- oss-security discussion
Verify every version against the vendor advisory before acting. Published 10 Nov 2026.