Ivanti Connect Secure CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527: the rest of an exploited zero-day chain
Two more Ivanti Connect Secure zero-days, a root privilege escalation and a predictable upload path, completed an exploited chain. Why the October patch isn't enough, and how to hunt.
If you patched Ivanti Connect Secure (ICS) for CVE-2026-104935 in mid-October and moved on, you need to patch again. CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527 are the other two pieces of the chain a threat actor used to get unauthenticated root on fully patched appliances. Ivanti fixed them on 29 October, and CISA added both to KEV on 30 October. The fixes from 13 October don’t cover them. The attacker also left no web shell and worked in memory, so Ivanti’s Integrity Checker Tool can come back clean on a compromised box.
Scope and ethics. This post covers architecture, exposure checks, detection and recovery for appliances you own or are authorized to assess. It contains no exploit requests or code. Lab validation means confirming versions, logging and detections, not replaying the chain.
At a glance
| CVEs | CVE-2026-111357 (privilege escalation to root), CVE-2026-118527 (predictable upload filenames). Chained with CVE-2026-104935 (auth bypass) |
| Severity | 111357: Ivanti CVSS 3.1 8.8 High. NVD/MITRE record: 7.0, AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. 118527: 4.3 Medium, AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N (NVD) |
| CWE | 111357: CWE-306 / CWE-862 / CWE-345 (CISA KEV), CWE-829 (NVD). 118527: CWE-340 |
| Affected | ICS 25.1.1.2 and earlier, 22.8R2.5 and earlier. CISA also lists 25.1.2.2 and earlier |
| Fixed in | 25.1.1.3 and 22.8R2.6 (29 Oct 2026) |
| Exploited? | Yes. Zero-days, exploited from early October 2026 (Volexity: 3 Oct). CISA KEV 30 Oct (federal due dates: 2 Nov for 111357, 13 Nov for 118527) |
| Chain result | Unauthenticated remote code execution as root (Volexity, SecurityWeek) |
The individual scores look moderate because each one assumes the attacker already has a foothold (“local authenticated” and “remote authenticated”). In the chain, CVE-2026-104935 provides that foothold, so treat the set as a critical pre-auth root compromise.
Description: how the chain works
Ivanti Connect Secure is an SSL VPN appliance: an internet-facing web front end (CGI handlers under the dana-na paths) on top of privileged system services. Volexity reported the chain on 13 October. Ivanti’s updated advisory (via Rapid7) splits it into three CVEs:
- Authentication bypass, CVE-2026-104935 (fixed 13 Oct). Volexity found that the public login CGI,
welcome.cgi, could route a request to protected CGI handlers because the URL and a request header (X-DSCGI-PATH) were checked against different paths. That gives an unauthenticated attacker the “authenticated” position the next two bugs need. - Predictable upload path, CVE-2026-118527. NVD describes “use of predictable filenames” that let an attacker “upload files with attacker-controlled content to a known location on disk”. Volexity describes the file-upload handler (
wu.cgi) writing a file to disk before validating it, under a name derived from an MD5 hash of the client-supplied filename. That left a short window in which the attacker could reach and run the file before it was deleted. Volexity’s original post described this step as part of CVE-2026-104935. Ivanti later assigned the predictable-name weakness its own CVE. - Root privilege escalation, CVE-2026-111357. The privileged
dsinvokedbroker looks up task programs in DSCache configuration data and runs them as root, and it trusts that data without verifying who wrote it (missing authentication for a critical function). According to Volexity, the attacker tampered with a web process library in memory, abused that trust to get commands run as root, then restored the original state.
Commands and results went over the exploit’s own HTTPS requests, and the attacker re-exploited for every command. No backdoor or web shell was deployed. That design is what defeats file-integrity checks.
Impact
Root on the VPN concentrator, which holds the keys to your network. Volexity (actor tracked as UTA0576, assessed with low confidence as criminally motivated) observed:
- Extraction of stored credentials, including LDAP domain credentials, followed by password spraying.
- Active Directory queries for Windows LAPS passwords and BitLocker recovery information, plus a custom Kerberos helper with Kerberoasting functionality.
- A renamed
tcpdumpcapturing LDAP traffic to harvest credentials. - Selective log truncation and self-deleting scripts.
Exposure and prerequisites
- Network reachability to the ICS web interface. That’s the whole point of the appliance, so assume any deployed ICS is reachable. Shadowserver tracks over 5,000 internet-exposed ICS instances (per BleepingComputer).
- A version at or below 25.1.1.2 / 22.8R2.5.
- No credentials when chained with CVE-2026-104935.
- Timeline: Defused saw attacks on decoys from 1 Oct. Volexity dates exploitation from 3 Oct. Ivanti fixed 104935 on 13 Oct and the other two on 29 Oct. Anything exposed in October should be treated as potentially compromised.
Identifying affected systems
ICS is a closed appliance, so you won’t get a shell to run --version. Use the admin console and your inventory:
- Admin console: read the running version (and the rollback partition’s version) for every node in each cluster, including virtual and cloud instances.
- Compare against the fix: 25.1.1.x needs 25.1.1.3 or later. 22.8R2.x needs 22.8R2.6 or later. If you installed 25.1.1.2 or 22.8R2.5 for the October advisory, you are still exposed.
- 25.1.2.x: CISA’s alert lists 25.1.2.2 and earlier as affected. Rapid7’s table gives 25.1.3.0 / 25.1.3.1 as the CVE-2026-104935 fix for that branch, but I couldn’t find a 25.1.2.x row for 111357/118527 in the sources I read. Check Ivanti’s advisory for your exact build. Rapid7 reports that Ivanti lists 25.1.3.0 and later on ISA4500/6500/8500 hardware as unaffected.
- Scanners: Rapid7 shipped authenticated checks for both CVEs in its 30 Oct content release.
- External inventory of your own address space: confirm which hosts serve the ICS portal, so you don’t miss a forgotten node.
# Run only against appliances you own: does this host serve the ICS login portal?
for h in vpn1.example.com vpn2.example.com; do
printf '%s ' "$h"
curl -sk -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' "https://$h/dana-na/auth/url_default/welcome.cgi"
done
That only tells you an ICS front end is there. It says nothing about the version. Get the version from the console.
Safe validation in an isolated lab
There’s nothing useful to “fire” here, and the vendor’s fix is a version upgrade. What’s worth validating in a lab or maintenance window:
- Logging pipeline: confirm ICS access/event logs and
debuglog-equivalent data reach your SIEM off-box, because Volexity saw on-box logs being truncated. - Detection rule: replay a benign, normal login against a lab appliance and confirm your parser extracts the request URL and the
X-DSCGI-PATHheader (if your proxy or the appliance logs it). The rule below depends on both fields. - Upgrade path: rehearse the 22.8 → 25.1.1.3 migration (Ivanti’s recommended route) on a test node. Per CISA, 22.8 reaches end of life on 31 Jan 2027.
Detection and threat hunting
From Volexity and Rapid7:
- Request anomalies: high volumes of requests to
/dana-na/auth/url_default/welcome.cgi, and any request where theX-DSCGI-PATHheader doesn’t match the URL path. Observed values named protected CGIs such as/home/webserver/htdocs/dana/fb/smb/wu.cgi, or upload targets like/home/runtime/tmp/<md5>. - Files on the appliance (via Ivanti support / forensic image):
/tmp/:ml.py,rq5.py,mk.py,rr.py,sp_run.py,sp_out.txt,spray_hits.json,pu.txt/data/.icscap/:h.py,cap*capture files, a renamed tcpdump calleddsstatmond/home/runtime/tmp/:ics-root-run-inband-*.pl,ics-root-result-inband-*
- Processes:
dsstatmondor anything else running from a hidden directory. Packet sniffers with BPF filters. - Log tampering: gaps or truncation in
/home/runtime/dlogs/debuglogand/var/log/audit/audit.log. Compare against your off-box copy. - Network:
108.165.147[.]64(UTA0576). The VPN appliance itself making LDAP queries, Kerberos requests or SMB/RDP connections it doesn’t normally make, especially LAPS or BitLocker attribute reads. - Volexity’s GitHub has the full IOC list and YARA rules for the request-header evidence and the in-memory privilege-escalation payload.
Integrity Checker Tool (ICT)
Run Ivanti’s external ICT as you normally would. It’s still the vendor’s baseline check and it will catch on-disk tampering from other campaigns. But don’t treat a clean result as clearance for this chain. CISA warns the ICT “may not detect” exploitation because commands run in memory. Volexity found the ICT did not detect the compromise they investigated, because the exploit patched library code only in memory and restored the configuration store afterwards. Volexity’s conclusion: forensic investigation is required, meaning memory capture and network evidence. I couldn’t load Ivanti’s advisory page directly, so check it for any updated ICT release that adds coverage.
Remediation
- Upgrade to 25.1.1.3 (or later). On 22.8, Ivanti recommends migrating to 25.1.1.3+, or 22.8R2.6 if you can’t migrate immediately. Treat it as an emergency change.
- Before patching or resetting, preserve memory and logs where feasible (Rapid7). A reboot destroys the in-memory evidence this actor relies on.
- If compromise is suspected, follow CISA’s recovery steps:
- Back up the configuration.
- Factory reset and upgrade (rebuild cloud/virtual instances).
- Restore the configuration.
- Reset all passwords (domain, administrator, local), revoke and reissue stored certificates, and reset stored API keys and license server credentials.
- Assume the directory was read. Given the LAPS/BitLocker/Kerberoasting activity, rotate service account passwords (especially SPN accounts), LAPS-managed passwords and the LDAP bind account ICS uses.
- Plan off 22.8 before its 31 Jan 2027 EOL.
There’s no workaround that replaces the patch for these two CVEs in the sources I read. Restricting the admin interface to a management network is good hygiene, but the chain enters through the user-facing login path.
References
- Ivanti security advisory (CVE-2026-104935, updated with 111357/118527)
- CVE-2026-111357, NVD · CVE-2026-118527, NVD · CISA KEV catalog
- CISA alert: patching Ivanti Connect Secure (rev. 30 Oct 2026)
- Volexity: chained exploitation of Ivanti Connect Secure zero-days
- Rapid7 ETR: additional ICS zero-days exploited
- SecurityWeek coverage · BleepingComputer coverage
Verify every version against the vendor advisory before acting. Published 08 Nov 2026.